State wage-payment laws, which forbid deductions from wages and salaries without the written permission of the employee, constituted a binding constraint on firms' choices to adopt automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans prior to 2006. Since the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which clarified the legality of auto-enroll plans and superseded these state laws, 401(k) participation has been higher in states that previously required written permission.
Introduction

401(k) plans are the dominant form of employer-provided retirement saving in the United
States. In the 1990s, some plans began to adopt automatic enrollment, whereby employees are defaulted into participating in and deferring salary through the plan, but may opt out. Despite research suggesting that automatic enrollment was highly effective in promoting employee retirement saving (e.g., Madrian and Shea, 2001) , by 2005 less than 10 percent of plans had such a provision (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007) .
Although the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had issued rulings in 1998 and 2000 that automatic enrollment was permissible for newly hired and existing employees, respectively, an oft-cited reason in the industry and popular press for the reluctance of employers to adopt such plans was that this design ran counter to some states' wage-payment laws, which forbid wage deductions without the written permission of the employee, something not obtained explicitly in auto-designed plans. However, there has been no evidence that these concerns constituted a binding constraint on firms' pension choices.
I present evidence that these laws indeed significantly deterred the expansion of 401(k) participation through automatic enrollment. I focus on the impact of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA2006), which set forth federal rules for the legality of auto-enrolled plans that superseded any state wage-payment laws (Purcell, 2006) , on 401(k) saving behavior in a panel of 703 mid-career individuals working for non-federal employers and who self-reported being eligible to participate in a 401(k). The sample consists of individuals in their 40s and 50s, young enough so that automatic enrollment can have an impact on 401(k) accumulations, but old enough that retirement is not a distant prospect. They are primarily white, married, with a college education.
As shown in Table 2 , there are 26 states that ban wage deductions without written permission of the employee. In eight states, state employees are exempt from these laws; in seven states, local public sector employees are exempt. The final two columns of the table show combined administrative, criminal, and civil penalties for violations of the law. They range widely. In some states, like Connecticut, Delaware, and Hawaii, the fines are levied on the firm on a per-employee basis for the violation and are very steep. In other states, while illegal, deductions do not carry explicit fines. Overall, there is substantial cross-state variation in how states treat and penalize wage deductions.
Unfortunately, the HRS does not have direct measures of whether those individuals included in 401(k) plans were automatically enrolled. However, a number of recent studies have documented a strong, direct link between the passage of PPA2006 and subsequent substantial growth in auto-enrolled plans, including Nessmith, Utkus, and Young (2007) and VanDerhei (2010), among others. The former is based on administrative plan data at Vanguard on 50 large plans adopting automatic enrollment; the latter is based on a very large set of plans maintained by ICI/EBRI. Therefore, because of these findings, I take a reduced-form approach.
Let i index the individual, s the state of residence, and t the calendar year, then I estimate the following econometric specification: The disturbance term, u , is modeled as
in which ψ is a vector of state dummies, ξ is a calendar-year dummy that takes on a value of one after 2006 and zero otherwise, and ε is white noise. The term ν in (2) is an individualspecific 401(k) saving effect that is treated as a normally distributed random variable. The primary objective is to obtain consistent estimates of θ , which measures the differential impact of working for an employer subject to wage-payment laws requiring written permission, before versus after the adoption of PPA2006, holding earnings, other pension coverage, and other factors constant. Hence, estimates of θ are akin to difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of the Act and, once the state and calendar-year effects are included in (2), are identified primarily by state-by-calendar-year variation in the opportunity to adopt auto-enrollment 401(k) plans promoted by the passage of the PPA2006. In addition, there is some within-state-by-year variation in the interaction term, because some states requiring permission exempted certain classes of workers (see Table 2 ).
Empirical Findings
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the baseline random-effects probit parameter estimates, omitting the demographic and employment characteristics, with marginal effects in brackets.
Controlling for state, year, other pension coverage, and earnings, on average, 401(k) participation was 9.7 percentage points higher for workers in states requiring written permission (relative to those in states that did not) after (relative to before) the law change. This estimated impact is robust to the inclusion of the demographic factors (dummies for age, white, female, married, widowed/divorced, some college, and college graduate -in column 2), but falls to just under 7 percentage points with the inclusion of the employment characteristics (union, firm size, industry, occupation, and job tenure).
If these estimates are truly picking up the impact of the state laws as constraints on firm pension choice, then participation after PPA2006 should be differentially higher in states with stiffer penalties for wage-payment violations. I find evidence of this in the final column, in which the penalty figures in columns 3 and 4 of 
. Participation is 4.2 percentage points higher after 2006 in states that require permission but impose no penalties, and increases by 6.8 percentage points with each $100 of penalty per employee, a rather substantial effect. These results suggest that state wage-payment laws constituted a binding constraint on firms' pension choices to adopt auto-enroll plans.
8 Table 4 shows random-effects two-limit Tobit estimates of θ in (1)-(2) from the same specifications as in Table 3 , but when the dependent variable is the dollar amount of the 401(k) contribution (the lower limit is zero; the upper limit is determined by IRS contribution limits).
There is little impact on 401(k) contribution amounts, indicating contribution rates under autoenrollment were similar for workers in opt-in plans. Overall, these results suggest that PPA2006 broadened, rather than deepened, retirement saving through 401(k) plans in those states with binding wage-payment laws. 
